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Porter Goss and hunt for bin Laden

Porter Goss' panel accused the CIA of "ignoring its core missional activities" and having "a dysfunctional denial of any need for corrective action." Read his full interview with NBC’s Tom Brokaw.
CIA Director Porter Goss testifies before the Senate Intelligence Committee
Director of Central Intelligence, Porter Goss.Jim Bourg / Reuters file
/ Source: Dateline NBC

Porter Goss became director of the CIA on April 21, 2005. Prior to his appointment, Goss represented the 14th Congressional District of Florida for 16 years. His first stint with the CIA came shortly after graduating from Yale in 1960. Goss began his political career with the Republican Party in 1974 when he ran for a seat on the Sanibel City Council in Florida. In 1988, Goss ran for Congress and won. Following 9/11, Goss joined with his counterpart, Sen. Bob Graham D-Fla., to lead a joint congressional inquiry into the intelligence failings surrounding the attacks. His panel accused the CIA of "ignoring its core missional activities" and having "a dysfunctional denial of any need for corrective action." Read his full interview with NBC’s Tom Brokaw below:

Tom Brokaw: Mr. director, does the war on terror look more complicated for you now that you're sitting in that chair than it did when you were on Capitol Hill?

Porter Goss: I think I have a clearer sense of purpose and mission about it than I did. I think there are some things that very definitely need to be done that we're doing. It truly is an intelligence war. And getting the right intelligence capabilities against the threat that's out there seems quite obvious to me. And I think the good news is we're making some pretty good progress.

Brokaw: Part of the problem is, isn't it? That this is a war without front lines. That it's a war of shadowy figures in many places around the world.

Goss: It's a global war and it's a real war. It's a war against innocent people and taking them out in brutal ways. It's a war that civilization has to win. And it's a war that civilization is clearly going to win. I would suggest, however, that there are some front lines.

We sit around and think about what can go wrong and protect against it. And we also spend an awful lot of time trying to follow leads, no matter how thin they may seem, to take people out of action or to talk to them before they can take an action that would be harmful to innocent people.

So in that sense, you're constantly going. And I would suggest I feel like I'm on the front lines all day every day. And I think all the men and women in the intelligence community would probably say the same thing.

Brokaw: For most of the American people I would guess, Osama bin Laden remains the darkly symbolic figure of the terrorist movement. Is he as important as he was at the time of 9/11?

Goss: Certainly al-Qaida Organization represents the embodiment of some kind of a network of global terrorism. And it's dangerous. It's dangerous in a lot of places. But we think in sort of an organized Western mind about what a network would look like.

It's not. It's very amorphous. Some of it is self-starting. There are cells here and cells there that are loosely related. There are associations. It's not something that fits nicely into a Teutonic order. But it makes it all the more difficult to deal with because you're not quite sure where to go, where to look. And obviously we don't want surprises. So we have to look everywhere all the time. And that is stressful.

Brokaw: But does he have the command and control capacity now to order up a major operation?

Goss: I would say not. I think we've put a pretty good hurt on the al-Qaida organization. I think we've certainly chased Osama bin Laden off the playing field in the sense that he can be out front doing what he wants to do. I would suggest that he's definitely on defense as opposed to offense. But that does not mean that there are cells and groups and support mechanisms out there that have some very sharp points that could hit us if we let our guard down.

Brokaw: I've been told by a wide variety of sources that al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations have really been reconstituted into a number of small cells operating more independently, more locally. Does that make terrorism more dangerous in many ways?

Goss: Yeah, I don't think so. It was always dangerous. It's just that we weren't paying quite that much attention. We can argue all day long about whether or not dispersed terrorists are harder to deal with or more dangerous, or whether concentrated terrorists such as we're seeing in Iraq are more dangerous and easier or harder to deal with.

I would suggest it doesn't matter because you have to get to the terrorists before they get to you. And that's what we are doing in the war on intelligence. Now, yes, I could say we've made some great efforts against Zarqawi, for example, in Baghdad and environs.  We've had some huge successes of lashing up our military and our intelligence capabilities working with our liaison partners, taking an awful lot of people out of the game over there.

But there are still more. And there are some that are rallying around that particular flagpole. Equally, we see people in other countries around the globe in what I call the terrorist belt trying to start mischief in their neighborhoods. Whether it's the Philippines or West Africa, there are all kinds of manifestations. And they all have one thing in common. They use brutal tactics against innocent people. And it is something we cannot tolerate in a civilized world.

Brokaw: Do you have any better understanding now of the mindset of the terrorist, the motivation of those who want to attack what we would call the Western ideal? And particularly the United States?

Goss: I think I do. I certainly spend a lot of time trying to immerse myself into what makes a terrorist tick. It's somewhat of an irrational thing, however. And I have a Western rational mind. At least I hope I do.

And I think of things from the point of view of what would I do? That's not the right way to think of them. It's to look back at what their patterns are and what their trends have been-- and understand that they probably will go to the most vulnerable targets, the softest targets.  They will probably take advantage of you in ways that you didn't suspect. They will use benign things like airliners and turn them into weapons of terror. And so we have to think in that dimension as well.

Brokaw: But do you understand the depth of their rage and how it was formed and why it continues?

Goss: I think it differs from terrorist to terrorist. I think that you have a group of people that have sort of a feeling that they are trying to settle a score in Saudi Arabia, which is where things started with Osama bin Laden. And he came back and he saw some things and he said, "I don't like this. I'm going to start a jihad."

I think there are others involved in jihads for other reasons. And it may go back to 632 AD when the legacy problems started in the Muslim world and they are still trying to sort some of that stuff out. There are the other religious and ethnic and cultural and historical factors that have built up since 632 between the Persians and the Arabs and so forth.  And you can go into a lot of reasons why people have an issue. This seems to be a place to vent that issue. And the people who are illogically and over-emotionally venting are the people who are able to be indoctrinated by the people with passion about what their agenda is. The UBLs about throwing the infidel out of the territory of the Gulf region so that Islam can prosper the way they think it should, not perhaps the way the prophet suggested.

Brokaw: Iraq. Six months ago, one of our principal allies in the war against terror, President Musharaff from Pakistan, told me that he thought that the war in Iraq as conducted by the United States was a distraction from the larger issue of the war on terror because it exacerbated anti-U.S. feelings in the Muslim world with the tactics that were necessary in many instances and the war and insurgency, the war against the insurgency getting so much play on television. Do you agree with him on that?

Goss: Not necessarily. I think that whoever decided to take on the terrorist factor in its present manifestation which is supported by radical Muslim would have had the same problem whether it was the United States or anybody else. The fact that somebody did something was the cause of the upset.

I think the fact that the United States showed the leadership to go out there and round up a coalition of people to do things about terrorism was, truly good leadership. I think the other option was to do nothing. We've been doing that for a lot of years and that got us to 9/11. And that's not the place we want to be.

Brokaw: But as a result of our presence in Iraq, we do have what has been a canny and cold-blooded insurgency led by Zarqawi who has risen through the ranks.

Goss: Uh-huh.

Brokaw: Many people believe that that insurgency has simply become a training ground for terrorists. And that it has become an effective recruiting tool.

Goss: It certainly is a rallying point for a terrorist. Has it created more terrorists? I don't think so. I think it has sort of brought to the end, though, terrorists who were determined to be terrorists and follow the same path of radicalism.

And I think that the fact that we have the hammer where the anvil is not a bad idea in terms of tactics in dealing with terrorists if you're going to use force.  And you have to from time to time. Obviously we are trying to use force to stop bad things from happening and the spread of the terrorism.

But there's much more to fighting this war. And that's understanding why some of these people feel the way they do. And you start getting into the pockets of poverty.  You start getting into the questions of hope and opportunity. You get into the questions of interpretation of religion. You get into a lot of history very quickly.

And trying to understand all that makes it very complicated. So I would suggest it's not an either/or proposition. It's a both/and proposition. You have to deal with it the way it shows up in Baghdad, the way it shows up in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the was it shows up in the Maghrab, the way it showed up in Madrid in Western Europe, the way it showed up here in 9/11. All of these are part of it.  And you have to get it all.

Brokaw: Let me ask you about some of our partners and allies in this fight. No more important partner than Pakistan. It's widely believed that Osama bin Laden and the other senior members of al-Qaida and other terrorist leaders who have not yet been captured are in the so-called tribal regions. And that they're protected in part by the sympathetic attitudes of some of the Pakistani Army units that are there.

Goss: I would think that would be a bum rap for the Pakistani Army units. I would suggest that that's pretty much sanctuary area for the terrorists. And I'm not sure it's an area that's fully under control of the Pakistani military some of these areas, any more than the other side of the border, the Duran line is under the Afghan Army's control.

These are wild territories. There are a lot of them around the world where in sovereign nations they just don't simply have quite the same law and order that we're accustomed to in this country spread throughout their country. I think the Pak military is trying to do a responsible job.

Brokaw: Should the Pakistanis allow American units, including some of your own, to come in from Afghanistan and into those areas?

Goss: Now, that would be obviously a Pakistan sovereign issue.  And that would be better put to President Musharaff. My questions would be to try and understand how he would have to make that decision. And he is in a situation where he can best judge the political ambient that is so critical to how he can have the success.

I truly believe Musharaf wants to deal very, very forcefully with the terrorists in the tribal areas because I think they've tried to kill him. And I think he believes that as well. I don't think that's really controversial. So he would like to see this happen. How he can effect that happening and how we can effect happening what we want, seems to me there's some opportunity for some good liaison work.

Brokaw: A number of people have told me that the United States at a variety of levels gets quite frustrated with the inability of the Pakistani military units and their special forces to react swiftly to the intelligence that we provide. Would you like them to respond with a little more alacrity in those areas?

Goss: Well, I would have to say this. We've got the best military in the world. And we perhaps are a little spoiled by the extraordinary things our military can do and the equipment, precision, accuracy and the use of technology that we have. Considering the history of the situation and the economics of the area and the difficulty of the terrain and so forth the politics of the area and what they're working with, I think they're doing pretty well.

Do I think they have a sufficient capability right now to get to all the places they would like to get and need to get? The answer's no. Is there a possibility of training them up to get there? Sure.

Brokaw: When President Musharaf was the subject of two assassination attempts by a well-known terrorist, did that change their mindset?

Goss: Well, that would, again, be a question I think you should push to him. But I think it made our arguments about the danger of terrorism a little bit more compelling.

Brokaw: Iran. A major player in that part of the world. It's widely believed that some of the senior leaders at al-Qaeda who fled Afghanistan went into Iran.  And they're now under the hands they're now under control of the Iranians. But we don't know what happened to them. Do you have any idea what happened to them?

Goss: I don't have all of the information I would like to have. But I think your understanding is that there is a group of leadership of al-Qaeda-- under some type of detention. I don't know exactly what type necessarily in Iran is probably accurate. But I don't think I want to go too far into that if you don't mind.

Brokaw: But is Iran a sanctuary for the Taliban and for al-Qaida forces trying to get out of Afghanistan?

Goss: I think the leadership in Iran understands that willful provision of sanctuary for al-Qaida and other known terrorist organizations is extremely bad public policy.  And I don't think they want to go there.

Brokaw: We have no more important economic partner in that part of the world than Saudi Arabia obviously.

Goss: That's true.

Brokaw: Saudi Arabia has its own problems with homegrown terrorism, Osama bin Laden, Izza Asaudi (PH), most of the hijackers were Saudis.

Goss: Yep.

Brokaw: What's your evaluation of how the Saudis are doing now against the terrorism that we have seen manifested in their own country with bloody attacks on their own people?

Goss: Well, leaving aside the evolutionary process that is going on-- in the kingdom-- and there's loud debate about how fast and exactly what that should look like. Let's leave that part out. I think the terrorists made a very critical mistake by basically fouling their next-- in-- in the kingdom.

I think that when they did some of the assaults they did in Riyadh and some of the other holy places and bombed some of the innocent people that they bombed, including Saudi citizens, I think it turned the tide. I think that the kingdom responded. And I think that they have actually been pretty effective in wrapping up a lot of the al-Qaida network.

Now it regenerates itself. There's no question about that because the seeds for that are well-planted there. And I think they've got a long term proposition on their hands in the kingdom.  But I do believe they are responsibly trying to deal with it before it gets out of control.

Brokaw: One of our correspondents, Lisa Myers, was just in Saudi Arabia. She had two clerics who were on our NBC News coverage saying that they were encouraging their young charges to go across the border into Iraq and join jihad against the United States.

Goss: I certainly would not surprise me because I still think there is a great deal of conservativism in the religious approach. And that appeals very much to a great part of the society there. So it doesn't surprise me that there are people who are misinterpreting what the United States is about and what we are trying to do and how friendly we really are with the interests of Saudi Arabia and its future.

The question of how they are going to be progressive and at the same time honor their religious traditions and responsibilities is something for them to sort out. It is very clear that that is a mixed message. So if you told me now there are still some clerics who are off message trying to suggest we are the enemy as opposed to the friend, I would understand it.

And I think that's one more challenge for us in the war on terrorism to correct is that we, in fact, are not the enemy. The enemy are the people who are hijacking their religion.

Brokaw: Do you think that the Saudi royal family is doing enough on the other front of economic reform, political reform, cultural reform? So that the young people who are growing up there have some hope that they can be Saudis and faithful to their religion as well?

Goss: The Saudi royal family is a large group of people. It's many thousands actually. And there are some who feel they're going too fast, some who feel they're going too slow. As you know, within the family itself, there has been some disagreement. I would suggest it's evolutionary.

And it is a question where they -- the leadership in the kingdom -- has to judge all the factors that matter there. And it is a very different society than the one we live in here.  They have to measure those factors, provide the right leadership and create that evolution in a way that satisfies further progress on the one hand, but does not violate the religious tenets on the other. It's a difficult chore.

Brokaw: But is there any question in your mind that Saudi Arabia is the central repository in that part of the world for sympathy for al-Qaida, the Taliban and anti-U.S. terrorism?

Goss: Well, I think there are other areas in contention. I think that there is any place where you have got things like perhaps the Palestinian refugee camps. Where you have an opportunity to go in and proselytize and offer something a little different I think that you have a seed bed.

And I think that you have to deal with all of that. So I wouldn't say that is if you have an evolutionary process in the kingdom that works and Saudi Arabia gets a little bit more adjusted to the modern world than it has been-- and human rights and things like that as we begin to interpret them and debate them for that part of the world, I would suggest that just solving the problem there is not going to solve the problem in the region.

Brokaw: Let me ask you about some of our Western allies. Germany currently has on trial a high profile terrorist suspect Mosadiq. The German prosecutors are complaining that they can't get additional information from the United States that would help them in what they would think would be the successful resolution of the case against him, and he may get off. Why aren't we helping the Germans more in the prosecution of that case?

Goss: Well, I have to tell you that I cannot talk to you as openly about this as I'd like to for a number of reasons. There are some sources and methods problems. There's also an ongoing investigation and prosecution… But I would say that generally speaking it's well understood that there is a problem between our intelligence capacities and what we generate using those capabilities, and applying them in a law enforcement case.

We always have the problem in sources and methods. We always have the problem revealing things that are still useful, important to us. And on the other hand, we have to be very careful that we don't prejudice an ongoing investigation. So and particularly when we're dealing in another country in another language and perhaps a different kind of judicial system with different restraints and different due process than we have.

All that has to be taken into consideration. And it is a problem. There is no question that in the war on terror there is an uneven response to what to do with a terrorist when you capture one. It's a problem. We're working it out I think in a very adult, responsible way in our national relations our international relations. And I think that we are making more progress.

But truthfully, there are too many people, terrorists who are shooting at us, at our troops or involved in terrorist acts or supporting terrorism, providing sanctuary for terrorists, who are detained and then let go who are right back out there doing it again. And obviously if you can't break that circle, you're going to be a long time fighting a war on terrorists.

Brokaw: There's obviously been a strain between the United States and France about the American policies in Iraq.

Goss: Uh-huh.

Brokaw: But we've been told at a number of different levels that the French intelligence has really been an effective partner, an ally of the United States in dealing with the war on terror around the world. Is that overstated?

Goss: I would say not. I would say that we have had a good many professional relationships that have been exceedingly important to us in the war on terrorism which we don't talk much about. So I wouldn't want to pinpoint anything specific to the French or any other country.

I would just simply say that I think the intelligence community historically and particularly now in the war on terrorism is working cooperatively. There is no sovereign nation that really wants to have terrorists running around in their country killing innocent people.

It's not good for any form of government that you're involved in unless you're in some kind of a reign of terror, the kind of thing with Saddam the regime that he had. You want to make sure that you understand that not everybody's going to agree that it is exactly the same way you handle this. But you do want to cooperate with the exchange of information.

And you want to make sure that you give everybody an opportunity to stop mischief before it happens, bombs going off before they happen whatever country. And that network is doing pretty darn well.

Brokaw: One of the president's strongest allies in the war in Iraq was Spain. Then there was that devastating attack in Madrid. A new government was elected. And the new government pulled Spanish troops out of Iraq. Is that a setback for the war on terror?

Goss: It's that, of course, is a sovereign nation's response to the way it wanted to handle that circumstance at that time. You have to respect that because we do respect sovereign nations. We are a nation that believes in rule of law. There are international accords and so forth.

Do I think it was a setback? No, because I think that if anything has happened in Spanish society, it is a clear understanding that terrorism is no longer just the ETA, just the Basques. It's a bunch of other people who will strike other ways in more brutally and with more commitment to brutality than the Basque Separatist movement, which they've been living with for years. So I think it was a great wake-up call. And I think the wake-up call is being responded to.

Tragically a lot of people got killed. So it doesn't make it great as a wake-up call. I guess I shouldn't put it quite that way. But it was a huge wake-up call because of the tragedy.

Brokaw: Let me ask you about the place where you come to work every day now. You worked in another part of your life as a CIA agent abroad.  And now you're back here as a director at a time when there is a profound transformation in America's intelligence apparatus. With all of the change that is underway and all of the commentary about the effectiveness of the intelligence community, some of which came from you, how do the rank and file people in this building maintain focus?

I mean, in any given situation, a family or a corporation or an academy, it would be a distraction of enormous consequence if you were going through that kind of turmoil.  It must have an effect here at a critical time.

Goss: I don't think it does. I'll tell you why. I think that the people of this agency and, frankly, the other agencies through the intelligence community, all 15 that make up the community, are pretty well focused on exactly what they do. People have a job to do.

They understand it involves life and death. It's national security. We all understand what happened on 9/11. We don't want to have it happen again.  And we certainly would not want it to be on our watch that something had slipped by. So I don't think you have that problem here.

I think that what you're talking about is a very large change in the architecture of the intelligence community and the way it will work and interface. I think what is important to know is that intelligence is people. That's our biggest asset is our people who are dedicated people. I think last year that we had 120,000 applications for a number of jobs that would be a very, very small percentage of that.

The spirit of this country to come and work in this agency and other intelligence community agencies is extraordinary. They understand there is a job to do.  Surely there are some that are concerned about what is the direction. I think the direction's now been clear. I think there is no doubt that this agency has a very strong future. The president has said so.

We have resources. We have been told to hire more people, to do our job more efficiently and more effectively and we are doing that already. And I would point out that since 9/11 we have been working extremely hard to remedy problems that we had when we had let our guard down a little bit. Problems we had when we were under-funded. Problems we had when we were under-staffed. Problems we had when we couldn't bring on the technology we had hoped to bring on.

Those things are being put behind us rather quickly.  So I would suggest you would find the morale here very high. I've checked the attrition rates, which any manager would do. They're running just about the same. Very low.

Brokaw: The Washington Post columnist David Ignatius was at a national intelligence conference at Harvard recently. And a senior official said to him, "The intelligence community is now like the American military right after Vietnam. It'll take us 15 to 20 years to dig out of this hole."

Goss: I would dispute that. I would think that the intelligence community is keeping us safe every day right now. I think certainly we have-- can prove, although we can't talk about all the details, of the number of disruptions to bad things happening in this country and elsewhere on the globe. The things we have been able to forestall as a community by doing our job properly.

Clearly, we can't stop at all. Defense alone will not win. So you have to take the offense. You have to go to the enemy in this. We've ratcheted up our defense. We have our gates and our guns and our guards and our procedures to get on planes and all of that out there. But we all know there's a possibility that somebody could… the defense mechanisms.

So we have to go on the offense. Our offense has put a pretty big hurt on the terrorist network. But if you ask me can we say 100 percent we're safe?  The answer is, no, I can't tell you that we've thought of everything. And neither can anybody else in the intelligence community. And that's why we come back to work every day and do our job looking for that thing we might have missed.

Brokaw: There's about to be a new director of national intelligence. John Negraponte. Someone you know well. But it's a new super structure.  Do you have a full and clear understanding of how you will fit into that and how this agency will fit into that and all the lines of authority?

Goss: I think pretty much so now. Two weeks ago I might have had a different answer. But after listening to the debates and understand a little bit the interpretations of some of the vaguer parts of the law, I think that we've got it pretty well sorted out.

I don't think there's going to be a lot of controversy. I think it's very clear there's plenty to do.  John Negroponte is a terrific guy. Responded to many challenges. Has got all the capabilities he needs to do this job well. He will become the architect of the number one job of stitching together the 15 communities so they work, 15 elements of the community so they work better as a team.

Break the stovepipes in our lingo. It means coordinate, talk to each other, share information with people who need to know. In addition to that, he ought to be able to bring on the vertical integration of all of those eyes and ears that are out and about in our country. Alert citizens, policemen, fire departments and so forth. People who call when they see something suspicious.

When you put together the vertical integration of all of that incoming information and all the horizontal coordination of the federal agencies that are involved in collecting information overseas, it's a vast amount of information. We have great computer technology to pull it together. And that's what I think John Negroponte's going to be doing for the next couple of years. Making that team work at an efficient level.

Brokaw: But from the outside looking in, it does appear that the director of the Central Intelligence Across, the DCI, which is a title that's about to disappear. Used to be a general with his own army. Now he's about to be a colonel with a division.

Goss: I would put it this way. I think that the intelligence capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are about to be enhanced because a director will be able to focus fulltime on the mission of the agency. And previously, system-wise, that the DCI who also shared the job of being the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had to spend a serious amount of time being the DCI.

Those functions will be taken over by the DNI. So I would suggest I have a better opportunity to get out in front and lead this agency in the direction it needs to go.  And we all know it.  We have our vision. We're on our way.

Brokaw: All the formal and informal analysis of American intelligence, when it comes to the relationship between the CIA and the FBI, they all say the same thing. It's got to be a lot more efficient and effective than it has been in the past.

Now, I know you're about to tell me that you get along just fine with Director Mueller.  But the real issue is that the rank and file and working level, and whether or not the FBI really is the best agency to be the point man on domestic terrorism.  What do you think?

Goss: Well, the way Congress has spoken and, I think  the results are that they are going to take the challenge at the FBI to do the job. Now, I think you've asked me two questions.

The first is, can the agencies work together? And the answer is yes. Back in my day when I started out at the CIA, the conflict was with the Department of State, not with the FBI. What has happened is, we've got a debate going in our country between privacy and protection. And obviously, we will not have Americans spying on Americans.  But, somebody has to collect information in the United States in a way that is not frightening to the American citizens.

That Big Brother is looking over your shoulder all the time. Or getting into your private matters. That's a very tough proposition. It's still, frankly, debated on the Hill.  And will be for some time to come. Because we haven't finished that work on the Hill. I believe the FBI is doing as good a job as it can to turn the culture from law enforcement first to protection against terrorism. That's a tough mission change for them.

We are very much in the position of getting information and providing information. And we are having to learn a little bit about, can we make that information more suitable for the use of law enforcement for our friends in the FBI. So, there's a little bit of walking in each other's shoes here going on.  And that's as it should be.

It's going to take time. I agree. It hasn't permeated all the way down. Yet, I think that Director Mueller and I would both say the same thing. That we both have some work to do, to make sure every day that cooperation is working.

Brokaw: You made a speech earlier at the Reagan Library in which you said this job was a lot harder than, I think, that you anticipated it would be. The hours are long. The work load is very heavy.

Goss: Uh-huh.

Brokaw: A lot of people read that as the first step in an exit strategy for a Congressman who has served his country in other capacities getting to a certain stage in his life. And maybe looking for a way out of this very difficult job. How to being the head of the CIA, especially under this new re-organization?

Goss: Very. Actually, I think it's the thing where I could best-- where I could make the greatest contribution. The speech you referred to, the context of what I was trying to say there is, help. Please bring the BNI now that their plenty for both of us to do. If two of us pull this wagon, it'll move a lot better than if just one of us. And what I think I was trying to say is that, I figured there's about two years that this place was a burn out job. But fortunately, we have the BNI.

I see a lot at the end of this tunnel. It's not the train. It's truly the sunshine where we're going to be able to get out and make this agency do all the things.

Brokaw: So, you would like to stay more than two years?

Goss: I would like to stay as long as I can be doing something useful. I serve with the pleasure of the President, of course. I believe I can make a better contribution on behalf of this agency that I've been to make by having to wear all the hats that the DCI had to wear.

So, I think this is a good change. I favor it. I think we lose no access as an agency. We'd lose no funding. We'd lose no support. We certainly got all the resolutions we need. And Executive Orders we need to add more people. We have people disposed on the Hill to provide us the resources and finances. We have the commitments for the technology. And we have the men and women eager to do the job. It's a pretty good position to be in.