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Decoding bin Laden

His videotaped address was packed with subtle messages, but not necessarily the ‘cryptic codes’ the White House is worried about. By Jane Spencer
/ Source: Newsweek Web Exclusive

During the Vietnam war, American POW Jeremiah Denton found a way to evade his captors and send a message home. As he delivered a coached statement on Vietnamese television about how well he was being treated, he blinked out the word T-O-R-T-U-R-E in Morse code. On Wednesday, Bush administration officials suggested that Osama bin Laden and his aides may be employing similar tactics, using videotaped addresses to send secret messages to terrorist cells in the Unites States and elsewhere.

WHEN THE ARAB TELEVISION-NEWS STATION Al Jazeera released two tapes this week—one by bin Laden and another by Al Qaeda’s Sleiman Abou-Gheith—the White House objected to their global rebroadcast. After a phone call from a Bush aide, the five major television networks subsequently agreed to abridge future video statements by bin Laden or his followers. But is that really necessary?

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer acknowledged that the administration had no “hard indication” that the tapes contained secret messages, but said they “could be a signal to terrorists to incite attacks.” But Islamic scholars who listened to the addresses in Arabic are skeptical. “Remember how they used to tell you to play Beatles albums backwards to hear ‘John is dead’?’” asks James Toth, a visiting professor of Middle Eastern studies at Harvard. “It’s the same thing. I don’t think there are any secret messages in the tapes.” Hatem Bacian, a lecturer in Islamic studies at the University of California, Berkeley, agreed. “I don’t want to call it a bluff, but it seems that’s what this is.” The two experts say that bin Laden and his aides probably still have sophisticated communication networks in place, which would be far more practical than cryptic codes buried in videotapes that may or may not be broadcast.

InsertArt(1212856)Scholars speculate that the White House is actually more concerned about bin Laden’s ability to generate support for his terror campaign in Arab communities around the world. Although the tapes were initially seen as brazen messages of defiance aimed at the United States, Arabic speakers say neither was really intended for a Western audience. Bin Laden’s message “was a direct appeal to the Arab-Muslim political street, calling upon them to join him in the battlefield,” says Bacian. The tapes were packed with subtle linguistic and cultural cues obvious only to a Muslim and Arab audience. “It meets the standards of rhetorical discourse for a Muslim speaker who understands the buttons to hit to reach the people,” he says.

In his speech, bin Laden’s attack of U.S. policy on Israel and the Palestinians was an effort to bridge the gap between the militant and moderate segments of the Muslim world. Anger over U.S. support of Israel and a perception that America disregards Palestinian suffering are rampant in Arab-Muslim communities around the globe. But bin Laden’s taped address Sunday marked the first time he had ever publicly raised the issue and signaled a desire to rally the broader Muslim community. “He knows the Palestinian issue is so dear, so all of a sudden he uses it,” say Dr. Maher Hathout, senior advisor to the Muslim Public Affairs Council in Los Angeles.

In a similar effort, Saddam Hussein invoked the issue during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, hoping to gain broad Muslim support for his invasion of Kuwait. Bin Laden also tapped Arab-world frustration about other U.S. policies during the speech, including sanctions against Iraq, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and U.S. alliances with some Arab governments, which bin Laden called “puppets.”

Subtle omissions in bin Laden’s address also carried meaning. “In his whole talk, he didn’t mention Afghanistan once,” says Hathout, who thinks that was part of bin Laden’s strategy to cast the present conflict as a broad war between Islam and the West, not a local skirmish. Bin Laden also stressed that he was not alone in the fight by appearing with three aides in the first tape and authorizing the release of the second taped address by an Al Qaeda leader. “What he’s trying to say is, ‘even if they kill me, there, are many bin Ladens that will carry the banner,” says Hathout.

Scholars say the tapes suggest that bin Laden is working hard to present himself as both a warrior and scholar—an effort to boost his credibility as an Islamic leader. Bin Laden is not known to be particularly knowledgeable about Islamic texts, but the address was peppered with quotes and references to the Quran. “The emphasis on learning and education in Islam is tremendous,” says Hathout, “Using scriptures to evoke emotions is an effective strategy.” Bin Laden’s method of delivery also carries special resonance in the Islamic world, Hathout says. “Within Arab culture, the ability to speak eloquently is highly regarded. The Arabic language is very rich, poetic and nuanced. He used classical Arabic, which is elegant Arabic.”

Bernard Haykel, assistant professor of Islamic studies at New York University, says bin Laden also employed nonverbal clues to promote his scholarly authority. His turban was a specific kind of head gear tied with a long tail, which is associated with the Companions of the prophet Mohammed. In addition, bin Laden and at least one aide sitting beside him during the address wore watches on their right wrists. Islamic law specifies that anything practical should be done with right hand; the left is for “filthy” activities. According to Haykel, the watch placement conveyed to a Muslim audience that bin Laden and his aides were Salafi Muslims (often called by the derogatory term Wahhabi), who adhere as closely as possible to the written text of the Quran.

Bin Laden’s careful setup in the speech was part of a calculated attempt to galvanize the Arab world and present Muslim viewers with a stark categorical choice between siding with him or with the “infidels” of the West and securing a path to hell. “This is a battle for the hearts and minds of a billion people,” says Bacian. Bin Laden suggested that all those who failed to fight for him would be “hypocrites,” a powerful denunciation in Islamic terms.

But scholars say bin Laden’s use invocation of jihad was a distortion of the term’s true meaning. “The word itself means exerting an effort,” says Hathout. “The connotation is exerting an effort for betterment.” Jihad is a layered term that can imply intellectual struggle or a struggle for economic justice. A physical struggle or violence is just one implication of the word. However, bin Laden’s address was a call to arms. He wore a camouflage jacket over his white robe and posed with a rifle at his side to indicate his warrior status. Abou-Gheith’s address on Tuesday issued an even stronger call to arms, declaring that it was every Muslim’s absolute duty to take part in the war because of the extent to which Islam was threatened.

Bin Laden clearly indicated this was a fight to the death, and Haykel saw an implicit message of goodbye in bin Laden’s speech. “It was like a martyr’s farewell statement,” he says. “The message was if he has to die for his cause, he’s willing to do so.” Haykel says some of that sentiment was communicated by subtleties in bin Laden’s posture. “There was this very deliberate, composed aspect to the way he was sitting, with his legs folded under him. He looked restrained, and resigned to come what may. He looked like he’d just done his prayers. There was an element of a last testament.” Under Islamic law, sacrificing oneself for the greater cause is an honorable plight.

If nothing else, bin Laden’s taped messages demonstrate a sophistication about politics and the media. Despite the Bush administration’s concerns about the impact the tapes, scholars argue that stifling such message could hinder U.S. efforts to secure worldwide Arab support. “If anything, it will sharpen opposition to the United States,” says Bacian, who argues that Arabs are eager to hear the Bush administration acknowledge their concerns about U.S. policy. Arab news networks have already reported the Bush administration’s media-control efforts as “censorship.” “A better response is for the administration to try to understand what is so appealing to the masses about bin Laden’s message,” says Hathout. “They must understand what sentiments he’s exploiting. Bin Laden didn’t create these sentiments.”

© 2003 Newsweek, Inc.